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CO MMENTAR Y
BOILERPLATE TODAY: THE RISE
OF MODULARITY AND THE
WANING OF CONSENTt
Margaret Jane Radin

*

Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the
scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial
exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting,
and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so
rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate

summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a
slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas pre
sented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the

groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of contracts and the
waning of consent as the normative basis of legal enforcement. (The latter is
also a major theme of my fellow commentator, Todd Rakoff, 1 whose contri
butions in this field have been preeminent.)
In conjunction with these two themes, I will touch upon the interplay of

standardization and customization; the dialectic of rules and standards; the
collapse of the distinction between the contract and the product it relates to;

the problem of shoring up (or replacing?) the liberal notion of freedom of

the will; and the allied issue of the political status of the regime of private
ordering.
I
Henry Smith introduced the important topic of legal modularity, al
though my focus on it is different from his.2 Modularity refers to the
practice of building a whole by fastening together preexisting objects,
analogous to construction with building blocks. Modularity became impor

tant to physical architecture in the first part of the twentieth century and to

t
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the virtual architecture of computer science in the later twentieth century.
Now modularity has become important for law.
By legal modularity, I mean the practice of creating a legal document by
selecting and cobbling together terms from a source compendium or from
different sources. Some model statutes are modular to some extent because
they set forth alternate provisions, building blocks from among which enact
ing jurisdictions may choose. In contractual practice, firms have for a long
time maintained form files that facilitate recombination of terms. Organiza
tions such as the American Institute of Architects ("AIA") promulgate
standardized contractual terms in the form of a compendium where the user
may choose among various terms to deploy for a particular transaction.
Boilerplate has Jong been associated with the idea of standardization.
The often-debated question is, "Are standardized adhesion contracts good or
bad?" That question-let me call it the standard question-is complicated
enough. But once modularity is taken into account, the complex issue of
standardization versus customization surfaces. Boilerplate can be used not
just for standardization but, because terms can be used as building blocks,
for customization. In fact as I will recount, a number of the articles in this
symposium project a somewhat paradoxical quality by focusing more on the
possibility of customization than on the standard topic of standardization.
Standardization versus customization is a complex issue. The "versus"
can mislead us. The two characterizations are not really opposed to each
other. Instead, both apply to the same contracts when viewed with different
levels of generality. Standardization serves customization and vice versa.
Uniformity at one level facilitates customization at another. Uniform terms
serve as building blocks in a customized document. But those uniform terms
themselves may be composed of building-block clauses arranged in a cus
tomized way. Likewise, the customized document that arranges the uniform
terms in a particular way can be used in a uniform manner and can itself
become a building block for a still larger particularized transaction. Uni
formity at one level, the level of modularity, facilitates customization at the
level further up, and the customization at that higher level can facilitate
more uniformity at a still higher level.
This symposium tracks the customized use of standardized clauses-in
the AIA contracts mentioned by Kevin Davis in his article,3 in the insurance
contracts mentioned orally by Kyle Logue, and in many other instances. In
some instances, recipients of standardized clauses can negotiate over them
("You gave me clause 2.3.l , and I want clause 2.3.3") and thereby achieve a
form of customization. As a number of writers pointed out, a standardized
form can be customized in practice, informally and ad hoc, by drawing at
tention to the beneficial terms for some recipients, forgiving harsh terms for
4
some recipients, or both.

3.
Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1075, 1078-79(2006).
4.

I will consider this practice later. See infra text accompanying notes 16-23.
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Modularity is greatly facilitated by digitization. The current era has be
come an era of modularity. Boilerplate, and contract itself, is undergoing a
sea change propelled by modularity, a sea change that has yet to be fully
recognized and taken into account in legal thought. Recall that the origin of
the term boilerplate involved a rigid, heavy metal object, the piece of metal
5
produced by a linotype machine. Once this object was produced, recombi
nation of the terms it embodied would be practically impossible. This was
the first era of boilerplate. In the second era of boilerplate, modularity
through recombination became possible. Firms maintained form files; by
photocopying, then manually cutting and pasting, and then retyping, variant
sets of terms were created. Today, in the third era of boilerplate, digitized
repurposing---computer reproduction and recombination-is easier and
cheaper by many orders of magnitude. Modularity now comes into play
much more regularly and with much finer granularity.
What are the implications of the sea change in modularity made possible
by digitization? Here, preliminarily, are three: (1) Standardized clauses can
be routinely cobbled together, even for small transactions; (2) Contracts, and
the clauses constituting them, can be routinely copied and redeployed by
firms other than the one promulgating them; and (3) Digital combination
facilitates automated contracting.
First, because various clauses can be routinely cobbled together, even
for small transactions-because we can standardize modules at a much finer
level of granularity-it is now possible to customize transactions that once
had to be standardized. When buying a product online, a consumer could
check a box to pay an extra seventy-eight cents to extend the warranty from
one year to two, or an extra twenty-seven cents to have dispute resolution by
litigation rather than arbitration. The determination of what the consumer
should pay for each clause and the total of the selected clauses could be out
sourced in real time to an actuarial intermediary, and the customized terms
could be presented to the consumer in printable form very quickly. So far,
this market has not materialized, although in the future it may; there's cer
tainly an analogous market offline for extended warranties and service on
big-ticket items, such as cars, and not-so-big ticket items, such as stereo sets
and washing machines. If online contracts become customized in this way,
there arise possible questions for normative theory that are intertwined with
empirical questions: To what extent will firms include the most onerous pos
sible clauses, which will be varied in the consumer's favor only by
consumers with more wealth and more knowledge? And to what extent
might this practice exacerbate the divide between haves and have-nots?
Second, because digitized clauses can be routinely copied instantly and
accurately anywhere in the world, it is possible for the learning effect that
leads to widespread standardization to be accentuated. Once a clause has been
tested in court, as Michelle Boardman argues, its legal effect is understood,

5.
(1999).

James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in the Client's Interest, 51 S.C. L. REV. 153. 158 n.9
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6
and it becomes more valuable to other players in the market. We may see
the tendency toward widespread uniform use of successful clauses proceed
much more pervasively and rapidly. In this case modularity could lead, at
the level we would be interested in for policy determination, to more stan
dardization rather than more customization.
Third, modularity of digitized contracts facilitates automated contract
ing. Suppose Firm A routinely buys a certain manufacturing input from
several suppliers. Firm A could program its computer with a number of dif
ferent sets of terms it would find acceptable for purchasing this input. The
supply firms would program their computers with sets of terms they each
would find acceptable for processing sales. When Firm A's automated as
sembly line signals that more of the input is needed, Firm A's computer
could search among different suppliers for one that offers at least one set of
terms in common. With an automated "handshake," the two computers could
make the deal, and the supplies would be sent on their way to Firm A. Of
course, such a procedure would not be suitable for all transactions, but it
would cut the cost of many of the more routine kind. And it would have the
beneficial side effect of eliminating the battle of the forms for those transac
tions.
Modularity, whether in architecture, computer engineering, or law, raises
an urgent question of interoperability. We contract theorists have not yet
begun to address this kind of question, but we must do so. Standardization at
one level permits customization at the next level, but customization does not
function if the standardized modules are not interoperable. They just make
the project break down: the building will be unusable, the computer program
non-functional, the legal document inconsistent, confusing, and perhaps
useless. The "Frankenstein" contract described by Choi and Gulati is an
early example of what happens when interoperability is not a focus of atten
tion.7
II
Perhaps a somewhat deeper reflection on modularity involves the dialec
tic of rules and standards. This dialectic entered the legal literature in the
1970s, initiated by critical legal theorists and later adopted into mainstream
8
discourse. Unfortunately, this terminology is confusing on a practical level
and misleading on a philosophical level. It is practically confusing because
when engineers and scientists speak of standards, they are referring to rigid
parameters that must be implemented precisely; standards are the reason
that light bulbs and plugs fit into their sockets. But that kind of rigid specifi6.
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH.L.REv. 1105, 1114-16, 1117-18(2006).
7.
(2006).

Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1148

8. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private I.Aw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV.24, 57(1992).
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cation is what is meant by "rules" in the rules-and-standards parlance. The
rules-and-standards rhetoric is also philosophically misleading, because
rules and standards form a continuum based upon the degree of vagueness
of a word or term, not a conceptual dichotomy.9 Yet because the rules-and
standards parlance has become entrenched (standard?) in legal discourse, it
seems useful to refer to it in the context of this symposium, as long as its
limitations are kept in mind.

It is a commonplace observation that both rules and standards have their

efficiency pros and cons. Rules are rigid and uniform, so they may be know

able, predictable, and administrable, but they are under- and over-inclusive

with regard to their objective. Standards are discretionary and particularized,

so they can be more accurate with regard to their objective, but they are less
certain and administrable. Which type of directive will function more effi

ciently seems quite dependent on surrounding circumstances. A number of
writers in this symposium seem to be arguing for standards (that is, discre

tionary implementation), as I will discuss shortly. On the other hand, Ronald

Mann offers a nuanced argument that rules will function better than standards
in the context of credit card regulation. w Other writers such as Ahdieh,11 Ben
Shahar and White,1 2 and Gilo and Porat13 argue that strict implementation of

rules can serve a strategic function that is profit-maximizing for the promul
gating firm. One such strategy, sometimes called the positivist kiss-off, is well
known in jurisprudence; it is sometimes useful to claim that one's hands are
tied by a rule that has previously been laid down.14 Those who have power in a
situation might find their power increased by being able to deny holding it.15
Now I come to what I consider a remarkable confluence. A number of the
articles in this symposium explore the ramifications of treating boilerplate,
considered as a rule-like object, as something that can be informally treated as
a standard. Bebchuk and Posner argue that in some contexts, it is efficient for
firms to promulgate rule-like boilerplate contracts that are covertly imple
mented

as

standards.16

For

example,

the

hotel

that

posts

the

rule-like checkout time of 12:00 noon can implement that directive instead as

9.

Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 78 1 (1989).

10.

Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" For Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006).

11.

Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006).

12.

Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufac
104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006).

turing Contracts,

13.

David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Con

tracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive
Effects,

104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006).

14.

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
(1991); William Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedura/Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 39-91.
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:

RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE

15. For example, consider the faculty that enacts a rule stating that no faculty member may
change a grade except for an obvious clerical error.
16.

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
104 MICH. L. REv. 827 (2006). In an earlier article Clayton Gillette advanced a similar
idea.See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 706.

Markets,
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a standard that would (if expressed explicitly) disallow checking out "unrea
sonably late." This permits the hotel to be strict with some customers and
lenient with others, depending upon what seems advantageous to its profit and
reputation. In another example, Jason Johnston argues that under some cir
cumstances, it is efficient for a firm to have strict rules that can be
17
secretly relaxed for those who complain. It is unclear to me that firms would
find it useful to incentivize complainers, but perhaps there could be circum
stances where that would be true. On the other hand, Clayton Gillette argues
that it would often be useful for firms to enforce rules strictly against quarrel
some or complaining customers and relax them for those who are cooperative
18
or easy to deal with.
If we extend this type of argument, it might be the case that firms can
maximize profit by promulgating onerous terms for poor people while rou
tinely relaxing them for wealthier people who might buy more and become
repeat customers. This circumstance would raise a normative-empirical ques
tion that is similar to the one I noted earlier with respect to the possibility of
paying extra for customization of clauses: Will widespread informal imple
mentation of apparent rules as standards exacerbate wealth disparities? Even
19
if so, should we tolerate the practice in the name of efficiency? Selective
implementation of rules as standards poses the further issue of leaving en
forcement to the discretion of private firms under circumstances in which
patterns of discrimination, on the basis of race or other proscribed characteris
tics, might not be easy to discern. If a firm routinely singles out white people
to benefit by non-enforcement of its ostensibly strict rules, that practice might
be difficult to remedy. Moreover, disturbing inequalities in practice may arise
even if not specifically envisioned, if a firm finds it efficient to reward those
who complain or request better treatment and it turns out that white men are
more likely to pursue such requests.
Even sticking to efficiency arguments, there is another side to the coin in
considering boilerplate as a rule-like object that can be covertly implemented
as a standard. In their article, Gilo and Porat argue that one hidden role of boi
lerplate can be facilitation of rent-seeking by informal customization that is
20
not socially beneficial. Boilerplate, say these writers, may give the appear
ance of fair contract but may be implemented otherwise. "Beneficial
21
boilerplate" may enable anticompetitive collusion.
In this context, I am reminded of Lon Fuller's concept of congruence,
22
which he elaborated in his description of the Rule of Law. Congruence
17.

Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard
104 MICH. L.
REV. 857 (2006).

Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers,

18.

Gillette, supra note 16, at 705.

19.
These are familiar types of questions, of course, but still not easy to answer. Before
trying to answer them, we have to realize where they are lurking, and that is my aim here.
20.

Gilo & Porat, supra note 13, at 1010.

21.

Id.

22.

LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW

8 1-90 (rev. ed. 1969).
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means that the law on the books must correspond well enough with the law
as it is implemented in practice; otherwise we cannot know and follow the
law, as we must be able to do if the Rule of Law is to flourish. When buyers
receive confusing or contradictory terms, terms that are too complex to un

derstand, terms that are written as rules but implemented selectively as

standards, or terms that mean other than what they say, people cannot follow
them and use them to order their affairs, and that is arguably problematic for
their autonomy. There seems to be an ironic decision to be made between
the amount of choice offered and the practical possibility of actually choos
ing. Mann, for example, shows that choices involving credit cards are too
2
multifarious and complex-too customized-for people to understand. 3
Would a rigid non-choice rule be better for autonomy because people would
at least be able knowingly to say yes or no to it?
III
Many of the articles in this symposium assume the collapse of any dis
tinction between the product, traditionally thought of as the object of
exchange, on the one hand, and the contract, traditionally thought of as the
agreement fixing the terms of the exchange, on the other. The collapse of the
contract-product distinction is a trope that has become very prominent in
contract theory, especially in economic analysis, and I refer to it in short
hand as the contract becoming part of the product, or contract-as-product.24
It collapses two conceptual categories-an object and a text referring to an
object-into one amalgam that obliterates the distinction between text and
5
object.2 If a cell phone contains a chip that will fail in one year and also
comes with boilerplate exonerating the seller of liability for consequential
damages, its market value is affected in exactly the same way by these two
features; for economic purposes, they are both just features of the product.
26
This idea was clearly stated by Lewis Kornhauser quite awhile ago, by Ar
thur Leff even longer ago,27 and by now has become the dominant position
of economic analysts. In this symposium, it is resolutely put forward by
8
Douglas Baird,2 explicitly assumed by Bebchuk and Posner,29 and implicitly
assumed by others.
In this dominant economic view, contract terms no longer comprise a
separate textual object or artifact that is the repository of independent free

23.

Mann, supra note IO.

24. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125 (2000).
25.
Machine,

26.
(1976).
27.

See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002).

Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144-5 1, 155 (1970).

28.

Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 93 3 , 933 (2006).

29.

Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 16, at 829.
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wills coming together in exchange. Instead, the terms become part of the
product, which is a unified set of disparate features: a battery, a forum
selection clause, a micro-processor, and an anti-reverse-engineering clause.
The contract-as-product view denies the traditional liberal normative under
pinning of contract as instantiation of freedom of the will, or at least renders
it problematic. Liberal will theory has become vestigial, at least in these
quarters, as I will mention below.
The collapse of contract into product has conceptually been in the offing
for a long time; but it has really come to fruition now that both terms and
products are digitized. Now we are presented with a bunch of digitized in
formation, some of which is terms and some of which is functional features.
The collapse is now literal, and not just conceptual.
The collapse of terms into the product reaches even further fruition, per
haps, with the advent of technological protection measures (TPMs). TPMs
are technological self-help. For example, fancy copy protection that disables
a program if the user tries to copy it can replace contractual terms that disal
low copying. TPMs replace state enforcement with self-enforcement; they
substitute an automatic "injunction," implemented by a private firm, for a
remedy, implemented by the state, that must be argued for after an alleged
30
breach.
Now, if one accepts the conceptual collapse of contract into product, one
could think that TPMs are merely an acknowledgment that all terms are part
of the product. When all terms are part of the product, it may seem firms
should be allowed to choose whether to implement them as digitized con
tractual terms or implement them as digitized TPMs. A TPM in this view
seems like further "productization" of terms that were formerly contractual.
But there's a significant issue lurking here, because TPMs look like self
help, and uncurtailed self-help undermines social ordering because everyone
can engage in self-help in response. When, in the liberal story, we exit the
state of nature to implement a polity, we are supposed to renounce self-help,
at least to a great extent, to escape the war of all against all. This backdrop
of liberal theory may well be the primary reason why self-help has by and
large been cautiously treated by legislatures and courts. Unlike machine
implemented self-help, boilerplate that-at least theoretically-can come
before a court before it is enforced is-at least theoretically---drafted in the
shadow of the law.
But what are the legal limits of self-help? This is a question that will
now have to be investigated. Can the ideal of public ordering be salvaged by
legislating regulatory limits on TPMs? If contract terms are now fully inte
grated with products, should their limits be developed by thinking about the
law regulating defective products rather than the law regulating unconscion
able or otherwise defective contracts? The collapse of the distinction
between contract and product, and particularly the advent of TPMs, seems

30.

See Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160

& THEORETICAL EcoN. I (2004).
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to undermine even further the problematic distinction, central to traditional
3
liberal thought, between public and private ordering. 1
IV
The traditional picture of contract is the time-honored meeting of the
minds. The traditional picture imagines two autonomous wills coming to
gether to express their autonomy by binding themselves reciprocally to a
bargain of exchange. The rhetoric of meeting of the minds has not disap
peared. But, as Todd Rakoff says, the normative power of the picture is
3
waning. 2 The liberal theory of voluntary exchange transactions between
autonomous individuals is now vestigial. The idea of voluntary willingness
first decayed into consent, then into assent, then into the mere possibility or
opportunity for assent, then to merely fictional assent, then to mere efficient
rearrangement of entitlements without any consent or assent.
In the parlance common in economic analysis, efficient rearrangement
of entitlements without consent is known as a liability rule. In the original
formulation by Calabresi and Melamed, liability rules were thought prob
lematic for autonomy and were to be implemented only when property
rules, because of market failures, were in practice even more problematic
33
for autonomy.
If we now accept a view in which firms can routinely
change property-rule entitlements of contract recipients into liability rules
by placing waivers of recipients' rights into form contracts, we have seri
ously undermined the traditional normative underpinning of contract (and of
34
much else).
Because of the historical importance of autonomy and consent, it is evi
dent that many of us are not yet ready to give up the rhetoric. Consent seems
obviously fictional in a great many transactions, however, and that is one
reason I say that consent is vestigial. Consent is fictional when the terms are

filed somewhere we cannot access, as in airline tariffs. Consent is fictional

when almost all of us click on-screen boxes affirming that we have read and
understood things we have not read and would not understand if we did.
Consent is fictional on websites whose terms of service state that just by
browsing the site, whether or not one ever clicks on the terms, one has
agreed to whatever the terms say, now or as they may be changed in the fu
ture. Consent is fictional when the contract ends, as one I saw recently did,
with "By reading the above you have agreed to it."

Not everyone is willing to give up on consent. Robert Hillman wants to
rescue it. He proposes some legal and practical strategies for making it pos
sible for recipients to read and understand the significance of boilerplate

31.

I will return to this topic below.

32.

Rakoff, supra note 1.

33.

Guido Calabresi

& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena

bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN,

CONTESTED COMMODITIES 16-45 (2001).

34.

See Radin, supra note

30.
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35
terms before they become bound by them. For example, the idea of placing
terms on a website for anyone who wishes to view them in advance seems
easy to implement. Firms may have incentives to do this. Firms might write
contracts that look reasonable and be happy to post them, hoping to enhance
their reputation and also hoping the contract will proliferate and become a
widespread standard, thereby enhancing its effectiveness.
It is less clear, as Hillman ruefully realizes, that making terms more eas
ily available will result in more people reading them. Hillman wants to
shore up vestigial will theory when possible, although his caveats and wor
ries show that it is an angst-ridden endeavor. In a similar vein, Michelle
Boardman worries about notice and the ability of insurance policy recipients
36
to understand what their policy covers; she too clings to will theory. Others
in this symposium seem willing to bite the bullet and abandon will theory in
favor of pervasive liability rules: if the market price is correct for the prod
uct-cum-terms, it doesn't matter whether any given individual understands
37
the features that we used to call contract terms.
If we accept the collapse of the terms into the product, is there any re
maining role for liberal will theory? It is attractive to try to retain liberal will
theory somehow, and I am thus sympathetic to Hillman's project, because it
is still our leading candidate for what justifies rearranging entitlements
among private parties.
If we want to rely on efficiency to justify rearranging entitlements with
out consent yet avoid abandoning a commitment to autonomy, we could try
saying that there is autonomous bargaining over the total product
consisting of the concatenation of terms and functional features--or at least
consent to the attributes of the total product. We can imagine that the user is
bargaining over, or at least consenting to, the battery plus forum-selection
clause plus microprocessor plus anti-reverse-engineering clause, etc. But
this picture does not seem normatively promising. What determines the will
ingness to pay for the total product, and hence the price of the product, is
not the consent of each individual, as in will theory. Instead, it is some other
kind of thing, having to do with how a market functions in the aggregate.
We do not "knowingly" accept a total product in the sense of "knowing"
how the battery will function or how the forum-selection clause will func
tion. The buyer does not knowingly accept the whole product in the way that
liberal will theory postulates in order to justify the transfer of entitlement by
the buyer's free will. Even if we think that something about an aggregation
of individuals and their knowledge does determine willingness to buy the
product at what turns out to be the market price, that is, a demand curve,
that something does not map onto traditional will theory. Traditional will
theory is individualistic in a way that economic analysis is not. The aggre
gate analysis does not support a notion that in the process by which the
35.

Robert

A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of £
MICH. L. REV. 837, 845-49 (2006).

Standard Terms Backfire?, 104

36.

Boardman, supra note 6, at 1115, 1117-18.

37.

Baird supra note 28; Bebchuk

& Posner supra note 16.
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market price of a product is determined, individuals are each expressing
their free will by means of voluntary interaction or even by means of a rela
tively robust and not merely rhetorical understanding of consent.

v
The liberal public-private distinction has been central to the notion of
public enforcement of private ordering. Hence, it is central to the traditional
notion of contract. Private ordering has been thought of as the expression of
free will privately, but in the context of a juridical infrastructure. The juridi
cal infrastructure is necessary to set out the limits of contract-delineate
what is off the bargaining table, such as baby-selling, contracts in restraint
of trade, murder for hire-and also to police transactions for coercion and
fraud. These limits, I would say, are necessary to the idea of private order
ing.
The legal realists deconstructed the public-private distinction by show
ing that contract, which is supposed to be private, cannot exist without its
public infrastructure, its infrastructure of legality. The public-private dis
tinction may have been deconstructed enough that it is no longer a workable
conceptual distinction. But I still think a pragmatic version of it has re
mained necessary in order to understand and justify the legal institution of
contract and the notion of private ordering in the context of the democratic
state and the Rule of Law. Certain functions belong primarily to the state,
and certain functions belong primarily to individuals to accomplish without
immediacy of state involvement, even though the state supports the back
ground infrastructure. There are borderline cases in which we can't tell
whether to call an interaction public or private, but the borderline cases must
not overwhelm the system. If the notion of private ordering is to remain vi
able, then the pragmatic version of the public-private distinction must
remain viable.
Here I think certain conceptual moves made by some participants in this
symposium tend to undermine the pragmatic public-private distinction and
hence to weaken the normative justification of private ordering within the
Rule of Law. Contract is moving toward property; contract is moving toward
legislation by trade groups; contract is moving toward productization featur
ing machine-implemented self-enforcement. All of these conceptual changes
signify moves that previously belonged to the sovereign infrastructure but
are now going over to the firm. For example, in IP law, contract is moving
toward property because mass-market end-user licenses are superseding
whatever user rights are granted by the federal IP regimes; and those back
ground regimes become in practice irrelevant to the extent that the user's
property rights are determined by the mass-market contract and not by the
38
legislated background law. The law of the legislature is being superseded
by the law of the firm. Legislative rules are tied up with democracy in a way

38.

See Radin, supra note 25. The acronym I coined for this situation, "EPSER" for "Effica

cious Promulgated Superseding Entitlement Regime," will probably not become a household word.
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that rules promulgated by firms are not, even though democracy in practice,
as the positive political theorists show us, is non-ideal. I think we do not yet
have a satisfactory way of theorizing this metamorphosis. The only thing I
want to say here is that this tendency to migrate sovereign functions to firms
puts pressure on the last vestiges of liberal will theory. Boilerplate in the
contemporary context is clearly raising the question; we have not yet talked
about the kinds of principles we ought to use to think further about it.

